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The Child Safety Protection and Consumer Product Safety
Commission Improvement Act: The Congressional Response to
the Commission's Inaction
by The Honorable Cardiss Collins
Congresswoman Cardiss Collins (D-Il.)
represents the Seventh Congressional
District of Illinois. Mrs. Collins has served
in Congress since 1973. She is currently
the Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on
Commerce, Consumer Protection, and
Competitiveness on the Committee on
Energy and Commerce and serves on that
Committee's Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations. She is also the
ranking Democrat on the Government
Operations Committee. She was recently
reelected as Vice Chair of the
Congressional Black Caucus for the 103rd
Congress.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1980s, the Reagan Ad-
ministration moved swiftly both to ter-
minate health and safety regulations
and to reduce domestic spending. How-
ever, because Congress recognized that
certain programs directed at children
are similar to preventive medicine, pro-
grams including Head Start and WIC
(Women, Infants, and Children Feed-
ing Program) were less severely cut.'
Indeed, as Congress realized, spending
on our children's health is an invest-
ment that will save our society much
more in future years than it costs us
now.
One form of preventive medicine
for our children that has not been satis-
factorily attended to is the improve-
ment of toy safety standards. While a
discussion of toy safety may sound
trivial, the statistics show otherwise.
An average of 3,200 children under six
require treatment in a hospital emer-
gency room each year because of toy-
related choking incidents.2 Between
1980 and mid-1991, 186 children
choked to death on children's prod-
ucts.3 It is estimated that consumer
product accidents cost society $150
billion a year.4 All Americans are
concerned about escalating health care
costs. As a society, we invest in pre-
ventive medicine and public health ini-
tiatives to reduce child mortality and
future costs of health care. At the same
time, we need to invest in product
safety.
A reduction in injuries and deaths
from consumer products would reduce
the growing cost of health care to our
society. The Consumer Product Safety
Commission (the "Commission") would
normally be expected to act to prevent
these tragic accidents. However, in the
deregulatory mood of the 1980s, the
Commission rarely acted, forcing Con-
gress to assume the chief responsibility
for monitoring the safety of consumer
products.'
On September 10, 1992, the United
States House of Representatives passed,
by voice vote, H.R. 4706, the Child
Safety Protection and Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Commission Improvement
Act ("Child & Product Safety Act").6
This legislation, introduced on March
31, 1992, reauthorizes 7 the Commis-
sion for fiscal years 1993 and 1994 and
[Ifn the deregulatory mood of
the 1980s, the Commission
rarely acted, forcing Congress
to assume the chief
responsibility for monitoring
the safety of consumer
products.
includes a number of changes in the
Commission's governing statutes to
improve the agency's operation! Of
particular importance, the bill includes
provisions directing the Commission
to take action addressing hazards asso-
ciated with toys, five gallon buckets,
and bicycle helmets.9 This legislation
is necessary, for even though these
products raise substantial safety issues
involving children,"° the Commission
so far has failed or refused to take any
action on its own.
Congress created the Commission in
1972, with the enactment of the Con-
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sumer Product Safety Act. I" The Com-
mission was created to address the haz-
ards associated with consumer prod-
ucts. The statutory purposes of the
Commission are: "to protect the public
against unreasonable risks of injury
associated with consumer products; to
assist consumers in evaluating the com-
parative safety of consumer products;
to develop uniform safety standards...
and to minimize conflicting State and
local regulations; and to promote re-
search and investigation into the causes
and prevention of product-related [ac-
cidents]."12
Congress set the substantive frame-
work and the procedural rules, trusting
that the Commission would address
particular hazardous products. Con-
gress also charged the Commission with
the enforcement of several pre-existing
statutes which applied to specific types
of products: the Federal Hazardous
Substances Act ("Substances Act"), 3
the Flammable Fabrics Act, 4 the Poi-
son Prevention Packaging Act, 5 and
the Refrigerator Safety Act. 6
Unfortunately, the Commission of-
ten refuses to address particular haz-
ards or takes excessive amounts of time
in doing so, forcing Congress to inter-
vene to protect consumers. Over the
last four years, Congress has directed
the Commission to take action with
respect to at least four products. For
example, in 1988 Congress passed leg-
islation banning lawn darts, 7 requiring
chronic hazard labeling on art sup-
plies," and directing the recall of cer-
tain water coolers containing lead." In
1990, Congress required the Commis-
sion to establish a safety standard for
automatic garage door openers. 20
The Commission predictably re-
sists such congressional efforts. Com-
menting on the Child & Product Safety
Act, the Chairwoman of the Commis-
sion, Jacqueline Jones-Smith, com-
plained that "product-specific legisla-
tion, especially any concerning issues
already addressed by the Commission,
could erode public confidence in the
agency."'2' This is an ironic complaint,
since it is the Commission's failure to
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take action that has eroded public con-
fidence in the Commission.
The following section will provide
some background on toys, five-gallon
buckets, and bicycle helmets, explain-
ing why they are important matters,
how the Commission has failed to act,
and what the Child & Product Safety
Act would require the Commission to
do.
II. THE THREE PRODUCTS
A. Toys
As the statistics cited earlier show,
our children suffer too many injuries
and deaths resulting from consumer
products. We can do a better job of
protecting our children by providing
parents with vitally important infor-
mation about toys to assist them in
making informed purchases.
Toys that present a choking hazard
ought to be labeled. Critics contend
that mandatory labels will not help
children who cannot read and would
present an unnecessary intrusion into
the marketplace. The critics also argue
that this is a parental, not governmen-
tal, responsibility. The critics fail to
recognize, however, that parents, de-
prived of necessary information, can-
not fully meet their responsibility to
their children. A warning label would
help parents avoid the purchase of un-
safe toys for their children. Ironically,
warning labels are required for all sorts
of adult products, such as cigarettes,
alcohol, medicines, andhousehold clean-
ers, but not for toys that have the
potential to choke children.
Unfortunately, the Commission, an
agency that is supposed to protect chil-
dren, recently voted against requiring
warning labels on toys that may cause
choking. It is important to understand
the Commission's current regulations
addressing choking hazards for toys to
appreciate the magnitude of its failure
to act. The Commission generally
regulates toys under the provisions of
the Substances Act. A regulation is-
sued under the Substances Act effec-
tive January 1, 1980, bans toys in-
tended for children under three, which
present a choking hazard due to the
presence of small parts.22 This regula-
tion is generally referred to as the
"small parts standard." A "small part"
can include the toy itself or small parts
which come loose during reasonably
foreseeable use or abuse of the toy.23
Although the standard bans the mar-
keting of toys with small parts to chil-
dren under three, toys with small parts
can legally be sold if intended for use
by children three and over. As a
result, many toys which contain small
parts also bear an age label to show that
the toy is not intended for children
under three. 25 In addition, a toy indus-
try voluntary standard recommends
labeling to indicate minimum age for
intended use; however, the standard
Ironically, warning labels are
required for all sorts of adult
products, such as cigarettes,
alcohol, medicines, and
household cleaners, but not for
toys that have the potential to
choke children.
does not require specification of the
hazard.26 Thus, no label is required by
law, and the wording of any label will
vary based on the desires of the toy
manufacturer. Some labels indicate
that the product is recommended for
children three and over. Others are
slightly more explicit and indicate that
the product is not recommended for
children under three. Still others go
further by indicating that the product is
not recommended for children under
three because of the presence of small
parts.
The wording of a label influences its
effectiveness. A label which merely
states that the product is recommended
for children over three may not be
effective in discouraging inappropriate
toy purchases. A parent may feel from
the wording of the label that the label is
tied to the educational development of
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the child and not to safety consider-
ations. Many parents, believing their
child is brighter than average, may buy
such a toy notwithstanding the label.
Empirical evidence that stronger
warning labels on toys would be effec-
tive in reducing hazardous toy pur-
chases is provided by a study published
in the June 5, 1991, issue of the Journal
of the American Medical Association.'
The study, based on a survey of toy
buyers, found that the voluntary labels
currently used by toy manufacturers
"may not be sufficiently explicit to
alert buyers of toys with small parts to
the potential choking hazard to chil-
dren under 3 years of age."28 In par-
ticular, the study found:
The wording of an age label had
a strong effect on a person's
willingness to buy a toy for a
child between the ages of 2 and
3 years. Although 44% of the
people surveyed would buy
such a child a toy labeled 'Rec-
ommended for 3 and up.' only
8% would buy the toy if the
label said 'Not recommended
for below 3.' and only 5% would
buy a toy labeled 'Not recom-
mended for below 3 - small
parts. '29
The study concluded that "a change
in the small parts standard to require
specific labeling . . . might substan-
tially reduce inappropriate toy pur-
chases without imposing any substan-
tial cost on the consumer, the govern-
ment, or the manufacturer."30
Over the last several years, the Com-
mission expressed some concern about
the effectiveness of the small parts
standard and initiated several proceed-
ings to review aspects of the standard.
The result of this review, however, has
been inaction. For example, as a result
of a petition filed by the Consumer
Federation of America and the New
York State Attorney General, the Com-
mission initially considered enlarging
the size of the small parts test cylinder.
On June 7, 1988, the Commission is-
sued an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking ("rulemaking notice") to
consider this issue.3 On March 21,
1990, the Commission voted to termi-
nate the rulemaking proceeding and to
withdraw the rulemaking notice on the
basis that the small parts standard and
the existing test cylinder were effective
in preventing choking deaths and inju-
ries to children under the age of three
by toys intended for use by that age
group.3
2
However, the Commission expressed
concern over continuing deaths associ-
ated with toys.33 The Commission also
expressed concern over the effective-
ness of voluntary age labels:
[T]oys intended for older chil-
dren, or small pieces from such
toys, often are accessible to
younger siblings. Additionally,
parents sometimes give a toy
which is appropriate for older
children to a younger child be-
cause the parents believe that
the child is sufficiently ad-
vanced to be able to use the toy.
A warning label to advise par-
ents of the presence of small
parts in toys or other articles
intended for use by children
three to six years of age could
alert them to choking hazards
associated with the use of such
toys by children younger than
three.34
Accordingly, the Commission initi-
ated new proceedings. On June 26,
1990, to further its investigation of
labeling requirements,35 the Commis-
sion issued rulemaking notices to ad-
dress choking hazards associated with
balloons, small balls, marbles, and other
articles with small parts intended for
children aged three to approximately
six. Given the Commission's track
record on these issues, and to empha-
size the importance of the Commission's
developing new toy safety rules in a
timely manner, the author introduced
the Toy Injury Reduction Act, on No-
vember 19, 1991.36 This legislation
would have required the Commission
to issue toy labeling regulations under
the Substances Act. 37
The Commission and its staff con-
sidered the public comments filed in
response to the rulemaking notice. In
a December 30, 1991, briefing and
options package, the Commission staff
noted continuing deaths associated with
toys. For example, between January
1980 and July 1991, 186 children choked
to death on balloons, marbles, small
balls, and other children's products.3 8
The Commission staff recommended
that the Commission proceed with pro-
posed rules addressing these hazards.39
In the briefing package, the Commis-
sion staff concluded that:
[T]he existing information
about the effectiveness of a la-
bel to change behavior is suffi-
cient to support proposal of la-
beling requirements ... Label-
ing combined with an informa-
tion and education campaign is
expected to reduce the risk of
injury to children under the age
of three from balloons, small
balls, toys containing small
parts that are intended for three
and four year olds, and
marbles... The cost of such
rules appears to be small. It is
the least burdensome require-
ment to achieve the desired re-
sult.4"
While critics argue that labeling is
costly, the cost of a label is minuscule.
This is illustrated by the fact that many
toy manufacturers already voluntarily
use age labels, although often those
labels are worded ineffectively. The
small cost of a label simply cannot be
compared with the value of a child's
life.
On February 26, 1992, the Subcom-
mittee on Commerce, Consumer Pro-
tection, and Competitiveness held a
hearing on the Toy Injury Reduction
Act and the reauthorization of the Com-
mission. Unfortunately, the Consumer
Product Safety Commissioners refused
to address the issues raised by the Toy
Injury Reduction Act.4' Subsequently,
on March 18, 1992, the Commission
met to consider the staff recommenda-
tions for proposed toy labeling rules.
Despite the views of its own experts,
the Commission voted to terminate
each of its pending toy safety
rulemaking proceedings. The vote was
unanimous with the exception of the
balloon labeling issue. The
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Commission's Chairwoman urged con-
tinuation of rulemaking on this issue,
but was outvoted by her colleagues. 2
The Commission's objections centered
around the difficulty of proving that
labeling would save lives.43 The Com-
mission seemed to ignore its own ex-
perts, the study from the Journal of the
American Medical Association, and its
common sense.
As a result, the Toy Injury Reduc-
tion Act has been revised to minimize
the Commission's discretion and to
I Who would suspect that
infants or toddlers could pull
themselves up and into a five-
gallon bucket without tipping
the bucket over?
require specific warning labels along
the lines recommended by the Com-
mission staff. Those provisions were
included in the larger Commission
reauthorization bill, the Child & Prod-
uct Safety Act. This legislation re-
quires informative warning labels on
balloons, marbles, small balls, and toys
and games that contain small parts and
are intended for use by children be-
tween the ages of three and approxi-
mately six. For example, a toy with
small parts would be required to con-
tain a label which states, "WARNING
- CHOKING HAZARD - This toy has
small parts. Keep away from children
under three years old." In addition, the
legislation requires all small balls in-
tended for children under age three to
have a diameter of over 1.75 inches and
thus be choke-proof. 4
B. Five-Gallon Buckets
Occasionally, mundane products
present unanticipated safety hazards.
For example, five-gallon buckets typi-
cally are found in industrial or com-
mercial environments and are often
used as containers for paints, food, and
bulk consumer goods. These buckets,
Volume 5 Number 2/Winter 1993
along with empty buckets purchased in
hardware and other stores, often end up
in homes for such household uses as
cleaning.45
Five-gallon buckets are a hazard to
young children. The Cook County,
Illinois Medical Examiner's Office first
brought this issue to public attention.
From January 1984 to October 1991,
the Commission received reports of
young children falling head first into
buckets containing liquid.46 This re-
sulted in 199 bucket-related drownings
and thirteen hospitalizations. The Com-
mission staff estimates that annually,
about fifty children drown in buckets.47
These incidents typically involve
five-gallon plastic buckets.4 8 The chil-
dren who have drowned in five-gallon
buckets range in age from one month to
twenty-eight months, but most are eight
to thirteen-months-old.49
Unfortunately, parents and child
caretakers are often not aware that
these containers filled with even a few
inches of liquid present a drowning
hazard to an infant or toddler. Com-
mission Chairwoman Jones-Smith held
a news conference in August 1990 with
representatives of industrial bucket us-
ers and manufacturers to raise aware-
ness of the drowning hazard. She
explained, "[O]ne of the biggest hurdles
facing the Commission... is the very
nature of the hazard. Who would
suspect that infants or toddlers could
pull themselves up and into a five-
gallon bucket without tipping the bucket
over?"' 0
According to a Commission staff
analysis:
The buckets in question would
likely be regarded as simple
containers . . .commonly used
around the house. The buckets
have no moving parts or electri-
cal or chemical hazards.... Few
would expect a drowning haz-
ard to exist with any bucket
since it is logical to assume that
it would tip over if pulled on. It
is even more difficult to antici-
pate that the hazard would only
be associated with a specific
size of bucket. The apparent
reason for the drowning hazard
is an unusual combination of
factors which only exist for a
specific period of time in a
toddler's life. Those factors are:
(1) the height of the bucket, (2)
the height of the child with re-
spect to the height of the bucket,
(3) the motor development of a
child of that height (and hence
age), and (4) the availability or
accessibility of such buckets.5
At the August 1990 press confer-
ence, the Commission, and the Coali-
tion for Container Safety, a group of
manufacturers and industrial users of
five-gallon buckets, announced a cam-
paign to encourage voluntary labeling
of five-gallon buckets to warn consum-
ers of the potential drowning hazard.12
However, critics have expressed con-
cern about the effectiveness of this
voluntary effort. According to an ar-
ticle in the June 1992 issue of Pediat-
rics, "[t]he Gypsum Industry and Proc-
tor and Gamble, which respectively fill
about 8% and 2% of all 5-gallon indus-
trial buckets manufactured, are the only
industries presently printing perma-
nent warning labels on new buckets
before they are shipped for commercial
use." 3 Furthermore, the Commission
estimates that only about 10 percent of
the five-gallon buckets have warning
labels.54 Despite this evidence, the
Commission has taken no further ac-
tion. At most, it encouraged the devel-
opment of a voluntary labeling stan-
dard, but even industry did not think a
voluntary standard went far enough.
The original version of the Child &
Product Safety Act, introduced in March
1992, included a provision requiring
the Commission to consider both man-
datory labeling and safer designs for
five-gallon buckets. 6 Since the intro-
duction of the bill, a consensus has
developed to mandate the use of warn-
ing labels. Accordingly, Congressman
Michael Bilirakis (R-Fla.) offered an
amendment on the House floor to
strengthen the bill by mandating label-
ing as an immediate step while still
requiring the Commission to formally
consider further safety measures. It
also requires the Commission to for-
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mally review the mandated labeling
standard to ensure its effectiveness.
5 7
The provision, which would be-
come effective eight months after en-
actment, requires each five-gallon
bucket to contain a label at least five
inches high and two and three-quarter
inches wide stating "WARNING" and
"Child Can Fall Into Bucket and Drown
- Keep Children Away From Buckets
With Even a Small Amount of Liq-
uid. '58 The required label would also
include a picture of a child reaching
into a bucket with an encircled slash. 59
The provision further mandates that
the Commission review the size of the
label sixty days after enactment and the
entire labeling standard one year after
enactment.' Finally, under the bill,
the Commission must consider a safety
performance test or other standard for
buckets.6
Public health and safety groups sup-
ported the Bilirakis amendment. The
National Safe Kids Campaign described
the amendment as "an important first-
step toward reducing the number of
infants who drown each year in five-
gallon buckets.. ."62 The Cook County,
Illinois Medical Examiner's Office
urged "that a warning system be put in
place as soon as possible and then let the
Consumer Product Safety Commission
monitor the success of that system. 63
Manufacturers also supported the
amendment. 64
C. Bicycle Helmets
Public safety experts emphasize the
importance of wearing bicycle hel-
mets. As Commission Chairman Jones-
Smith pointed out:
Each year approximately 1,200
cyclists are killed, and more
than half a million bicycle-re-
lated injuries are treated in hos-
pital emergency rooms. Most
of the deaths, some 70%, are
due to head trauma and about
30% of the injuries are to the
head or face. 65
There are currently two major vol-
untary standards that apply to the safety
of bicycle helmets: the American Na-
tional Standards Institute ("ANSI") bi-
cycle helmet standard Z90.4-1984 and
the Snell Memorial Foundation Stan-
dard for protective headgear used in
bicycling (B-90). 6 In addition, a third
voluntary standard is being developed
by the American Society For Testing
and Materials ("ASTM").67 While com-
pliance with these voluntary standards
is considered high, there is no legal
requirement that helmets comply with
either one of the standards.
These standards also have been criti-
cized for not addressing some impor-
tant issues. For example, as the May
1990 issue of ConsumerReports pointed
out, no standard currently measures
resistance to roll-off, a helmet's ability
to stay on the head in a crash.68 This
aspect is not currently addressed in any
voluntary standard. 69 It is expected,
however, that the ASTM standard un-
der development will deal with this
issue. In addition, the House Energy
and Commerce Committee Report on
the Child & Product Safety Act notes,
"neither standard includes specific re-
quirements for children's helmets.
However, children under age fifteen
represent about two-thirds of the bi-
cycle-related injuries and one-third of
the bicycle-related deaths."7"
Based on these concerns, a coalition
of thirty-five medical, safety, and bi-
cycle groups, led by the National Safe
Kids Campaign and Consumer Federa-
tion of America, petitioned the Com-
mission to establish a mandatory bi-
cycle helmet standard.7' However, in
July 1991, the Commission voted two
to one to deny the petition stating that
the current standards were adequate.72
In response, the Child & Product
Safety Act requires all bicycle helmets
manufactured after sixty days from the
time that the bill is enacted to conform
to either the ANSI or Snell standard, or
such other standard as the Commission
determines is appropriate. The bill
further directs the Commission to con-
duct a rulemaking proceeding to de-
velop a mandatory standard, harmo-
nizing the requirements of the existing
voluntary standards and including in
the mandatory standard provisions to
address roll-off resistance and the risk
of injury to children.73
III. CONCLUSION
In passing the Child & Product
Safety Act, the House has sent a clear
message to the Commission that it must
address safety issues concerning prod-
ucts which present hazards to children.
Unfortunately, the Senate failed to act
on this legislation before Congress ad-
journed on October 9, 1992.14 It is
inexcusable that an agency entrusted
with the responsibility of protecting
our children from dangerous toys has
ignored its mandate. o+o
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